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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Aaron J. Campbell *
INTRODUCTION
This article aims to provide a succinct review of noteworthy
cases in the areas of criminal law and procedure that the Su-
preme Court of Virginia and the Court of Appeals of Virginia de-
cided this past year. Instead of covering every ruling or procedur-
al point in a particular case, this article focuses on the "take-
away" of the holdings with the most precedential value. This arti-
cle also summarizes significant changes to criminal law and pro-
cedure enacted by the 2014 Virginia General Assembly.
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Trial
1. Competency
In Dang v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
sidered whether a defendant was entitled to a second competency
evaluation.' Initially, a court-appointed psychologist evaluated
Dang and found him competent to stand trial for murder.2 Eleven
months later, Dang's counsel moved for a second evaluation after
learning new information about Dang's life history and childhood
trauma.' Dang's counsel believed this information could potential-
* Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Litigation Section, Office of the Attorney
General, Commonwealth of Virginia. J.D., 2009, University of Richmond School of Law;
B.A., 2002, Concord University.
1. 287 Va. 132, 135, 752 S.E.2d 885, 887 (2014). Under the Virginia Code, a compe-
tency evaluation is required when there is probable cause to believe a defendant 'lacks
substantial capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist his attorney in
his own defense . . . ." VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-169.1 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
2. Dang, 287 Va. at 136, 752 S.E.2d at 887.
3. Id. at 137-38, 752 S.E.2d at 888.
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ly be a sign of mental illness or brain injury. Finding no probable
cause to believe that Dang lacked understanding of the proceed-
ings or the ability to assist in his defense, the circuit court denied
the request and the case proceeded to trial.' Dang's counsel re-
newed the request on the morning of trial, which the circuit court
denied after conducting an additional plea colloquy.6
The supreme court held the circuit court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in finding no probable cause to order a second competency
evaluation.' In doing so, the supreme court declared "[w]hen the
defendant has already been afforded a competency evaluation in
which he is found competent, the circuit court need not order a
second evaluation unless it is presented with a substantial
change in circumstances,"' and "evidence supporting probable
cause must be directed to the question of defendant's competency
at the time of trial."' Thus, even if Dang's failure to disclose an
accurate life history was an indication of an underlying mental
illness or brain injury, that did not necessarily render him in-
competent to stand trial.'o In the supreme court's opinion, the cir-
cuit court correctly found no information or substantial change in
circumstances to question Dang's present competence." The su-
preme court acknowledged that many of Dang's responses to the
circuit court during the plea colloquies were nonresponsive; how-
ever, his tendency to shift focus to the facts of the murder and ex-
plain "his side of the story" was addressed by the court-appointed
psychologist and consistent with the behavior he exhibited during
his evaluation.1 2 Therefore, the supreme court found Dang's be-
havior consistent with a "heightened apprehension of going to tri-
al, rather than a sudden deterioration in his understanding of the
nature of the proceedings on the morning of trial.""
4. Id. at 138, 752 S.E.2d at 888-89.
5. Id. at 139, 752 S.E.2d at 889.
6. Id. at 140-44, 752 S.E.2d at 890-92.
7. Id. at 153, 752 S.E.2d at 897-98.
8. Id. at 145, 752 S.E.2d at 893.
9. Id. at 148, 752 S.E.2d at 895.
10. Id., 752 S.E.2d at 894-95.
11. Id. at 148-49, 752 S.E.2d at 895.
12. Id. at 149, 752 S.E.2d at 895.
13. Id. at 150, 752 S.E.2d at 896. In the dissenting opinion's view, the majority's hold-
ing did not comport with the evidence and the controlling precedent of Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162 (1975). See Dang, at 153--54, 157, 752 S.E.2d at 898, 900 (Mims, J., dissent-
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2. Right to Counsel
The high-profile murder trial of Huguely v. Commonwealth
presented a novel right to counsel issue.14 Huguely, a University
of Virginia student, stood trial for killing another student-his
former girlfriend.'1 Two attorneys represented Huguely at trial-
Rhonda Quagliana and Francis McQ. Lawrence." In the midst of
the nearly two-week trial, Quagliana became very ill." Due to
Quagliana's illness, the circuit court excused the jury for the en-
tire day on February 16, 2012." The following day, Quagliana
remained too ill to attend court.'9 Lawrence offered to question
defense witnesses in her absence.2 o But after a recess, Lawrence
moved for a continuance, informing the court that Huguely, was
uncomfortable with taking any evidence until Quagliana re-
turned.2' The circuit court denied the request.2
The Court of Appeals of Virginia considered whether the circuit
court committed reversible error under the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution in denying the continuance.2 3 Re-
lying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, Huguely argued he was entitled to a
new trial because he was forced to proceed in trial without his re-
tained counsel of choice." The court of appeals held the "common-
ality" in Gonzalez-Lopez, and the other cases relied upon by Hu-
guely, "was a ruling by a trial court that essentially barred a
retained attorney from representing the defendant in the first
place."25 In Huguely's case, rather than barring Quagliana from
representing him at trial, the circuit court simply responded to
ing).
14. 63 Va. App. 92, 97-98, 102, 754 S.E.2d 557, 559, 561-62 (2014).
15. Id. at 98-102, 754 S.E.2d at 560-61.
16. Id. at 103, 754 S.E.2d at 562.
17. Id. at 102-03, 754 S.E.2d at 562.
18. Id. at 103, 754 S.E.2d at 562.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 104, 754 S.E.2d at 562.
21. Id.
22. Id., 754 S.E.2d at 563.
23. Id. at 105-06, 754 S.E.2d at 563.
24. Id. at 106, 754 S.E.2d 563 (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140
(2006)).
25. Id. at 109, 754 S.E.2d at 565.
2014] 75
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her illness." The court of appeals observed that "surely the Sixth
Amendment does not impose an absolute requirement, when a de-
fendant is represented by two or more retained attorneys, that a
jury trial must completely grind to a halt, as a matter of constitu-
tional law, simply because one of the defendant's retained attor-
neys has become ill."2 7 Given the uncertainty of Quagliana's ill-
ness, and that the trial judge only ordered the trial to proceed in
her absence when doing so had the least impact on her role as co-
counsel, the court of appeals found that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in denying the continuance."
3. Hearsay
In Bailey v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered, as a matter of first impression, whether a defendant's
invocation of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify satisfies
the unavailability prong of the statement-against-interest hear-
say exception." Bailey chose not to testify at his trial for robbery
and related charges.o Under Bailey's theory of the case, he met
with the victim to sell him drugs and, when the victim had tried
to take the drugs without paying, Bailey merely took the money
he was due for the drugs." In support of this theory, Bailey's girl-
friend attempted to testify about statements Bailey allegedly
made about the drug transaction." The circuit court ruled the ev-
idence was inadmissible hearsay. In making this ruling, the trial
court found the evidence unreliable even though Bailey satisfied
the unavailability requirement of the statement-against-interest
hearsay exception."
The court of appeals held the circuit court erred as a matter of
law in ruling that the testimony of Bailey was unavailable, but
did not err in refusing to admit the statements.3 ' The court of ap-
26. Id. at 110, 754 S.E.2d at 565.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 115, 754 S.E.2d at 568.
29. 62 Va. App. 499, 506, 749 S.E.2d 544, 547 (2013).
30. Id. at 503-04, 749 S.E.2d at 545-46.
31. Id. at 504, 749 S.E.2d at 546.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 505, 749 S.E.2d at 546.
35. Id., 749 S.E.2d at 547.
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peals found that because Bailey had complete control over his
own availability as a witness, "he failed as a matter of law to
prove his testimony was unavailable."3 6 The court of appeals rec-
ognized that normally "a declarant is unavailable if the declarant
invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent." The
court of appeals, however, reasoned that "allowing a defendant to
control the admissibility of his prior statement by invoking his
Fifth Amendment right not to testify, thereby rendering himself
unavailable, would eviscerate the hearsay rule's unavailability
requirement."" The court refused to interpret the hearsay rule "to
allow a defendant to invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to tes-
tify as a shield to protect and insulate him against cross-
examination only to simultaneously employ that right as a sword
to obtain the admission of his alleged extrajudicial prior self-
serving hearsay statements."39
4. Evidence
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Ferrell v. Commonwealth,
decided whether a principal in the second degree is entitled to
admit into evidence an acquittal order from a separate case
against the alleged principal in the first degree.40 Following a
shooting, Ferrell and his brother were charged with malicious
wounding and use of a firearm during a felony." The trial of Fer-
rell's brother occurred first and resulted in a not guilty verdict.42
At Ferrell's trial, the Commonwealth accused Ferrell of acting as
a principle in the second degree to his brother's crime.43 Ferrell
argued he could not be found guilty as a principal in the second
degree because his brother, the alleged principal in the first de-
gree, had been acquitted by a different jury. Ferrell sought to in-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 508, 749 S.E.2d at 548 (quoting Boney v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 638,
643, 432 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1993)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 509, 749 S.E.2d at 548.
40. 62 Va. App. 142, 143, 743 S.E.2d 284, 285 (2013).
41. Id. at 144, 743 S.E.2d at 285.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
2014] 77
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troduce his brother's acquittal order into evidence, but was de-
*45
nied.
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's refusal to ad-
mit the order.46 The court of appeals explained that Virginia fol-
lows the common law principle that, unlike an accessory to a
crime, "a principal in the second degree could be convicted not-
withstanding the prior acquittal of the first-degree principal."47
The court of appeals thus held that "the order acquitting Ferrell's
brother had no legal relevance to Ferrell's guilt or innocence.""
The differing results in the separate trials could result from a
number of explanations: 'lenity by the jury toward the brother, a
different retelling of the facts by key witnesses, dissimilar strate-
gic decisions of counsel, disparate evidentiary rulings, divergent
arguments of counsel, or . .. an honest disagreement between the
two juries about the persuasive force of the totality of evidence."
In Gardner v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether the circuit court erred in excluding evidence
of good character sought by the defendant."o At his trial for vari-
ous sex crimes against minors, Gardner attempted to question
two of his character witnesses "about his reputation in the com-
munity for being a good caretaker of children and for not being
sexually assaultive or abusive toward them."" The Common-
wealth objected to the question on the basis that: (1) "Gardner
was limited to character evidence concerning reputation for truth-
fulness, veracity or peacefulness," and (2) the question was im-
proper because the disputed character evidence did not exclusive-
ly concern Gardner's reputation before the incident." The circuit
court sustained the Commonwealth's objection."
The supreme court held the circuit court erred as a matter of
law because "neither ground was a proper basis for sustaining the
45. Id., 743 S.E.2d at 285-86.
46. Id. at 143, 743 S.E.2d at 285.
47. Id. at 146, 743 S.E.2d at 287 (quoting Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 16
(1980)).
48. Id. at 150, 743 S.E.2d at 288.
49. Id., 743 S.E.2d at 288-89.
50. No. 131166, 2014 Va. LEXIS 98 at *1, 758 S.E.2d 540, 542 (June 5, 2014).
51. Id. at *1, *3, 758 S.E.2d at 542.
52. Id. at *3-4, 758 S.E.2d at 544.
53. Id. at *4, 758 S.E.2d at 542.
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Commonwealth's objection."54 First, the supreme court reaffirmed
that reputation or character evidence is not limited solely to
truthfulness, but may be offered "to prove good character for any
trait relevant in the case."" Next, the supreme court made clear
that, unlike evidence of a defendant's bad character, evidence of a
defendant's good reputation is not limited to a defendant's repu-
tation before being criminally charged." To hold otherwise, ac-
cording to the supreme court, would ask the impossible: "that a
defense character witness not testify to the defendant's reputa-
tion at the time of trial but reconstruct what that reputation was
prior to the offense.""
5. Corpus Delicti Rule
In Allen v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia re-
versed a conviction for aggravated sexual battery, despite the de-
fendant confessing to the crime." Allen confessed to both his
daughter and the police that he engaged in inappropriate sexual
touching with his four-year-old grandson. Under the corpus de-
licti rule, Allen could not be convicted solely on his extrajudicial
confession unless the Commonwealth introduced sufficient evi-
dence independent of the confession to prove the crime actually
occurred." The rule requires only "slight corroboration of the con-
fession" to establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable
doubt." The only evidence outside Allen's confession came from
the testimony of his daughter that Allen had various opportuni-
ties to be alone with his grandson, he sometimes slept in the
same bed as his grandson, and they wrestled together.62 The su-
preme court found this evidence fell short of satisfying the slight
corroboration requirement.6 3 The court found Allen's mere oppor-
tunity to commit the corpus delicti was insufficient to provide
54. Id. at *8, 758 S.E.2d at 544.
55. Id.
56. Id. at *9, 758 S.E.2d at 544.
57. Id. at *9-10, 758 S.E.2d at 544.
58. 287 Va. 68, 77-78, 752 S.E.2d 856, 862 (2014).
59 Id. at 70-71, 752 S.E.2d at 858.
60. Id. at 74, 752 S.E.2d at 860.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 75, 752 S.E.2d at 860.
63. Id. at 77, 752 S.E.2d at 861-62.
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slight corroboration." The supreme court further found Allen's
sleeping alone and wrestling alone with his grandson was just as
consistent with the non-commission of aggravated sexual battery
as with its commission."
B. Sentencing
1. Deferred Dispositions
The Supreme Court of Virginia revisited the hotly contested is-
sue of a circuit court's authority to withhold a finding of guilt and
defer a disposition in Starrs v. Commonwealth.6 In 2011, the
court held that "during the interval between the conclusion of the
evidence and the entry of a written order adjudicating [a] defend-
ant guilty, [a trial court has] the inherent power, in the exercise
of its discretion, to take the matter under advisement and to con-
tinue the case for future disposition."6 The question in Starrs
was: "[u]pon accepting a guilty plea and entering it in the record,
does a trial court nevertheless retain the inherent authority to
withhold a finding of guilt and defer the disposition?""
After entering guilty pleas to two felonies, Starrs asked the cir-
cuit court to withhold a finding of guilt and continue the case for
a period of time, and eventually dismiss the charges." The circuit
court determined it did not have the discretion to do that since
Starrs had entered a guilty plea.o But the supreme court found
that mere acceptance and entry of a guilty plea does not consti-
tute "a formal adjudication of guilt."" Instead, "a defendant's
guilty plea supplies the necessary proof and a trial court, after ac-
cepting and entering a guilty plea, may 'proceed to judgment,' i.e.,
may proceed to adjudicate the defendant guilty and impose the
punishment proscribed by law."72 Thus, the supreme court con-
64. Id. at 76, 752 S.E.2d at 861.
65. Id. at 77, 752 S.E.2d at 861-62.
66. 287 Va. 1, 4, 752 S.E.2d 812, 814 (2014).
67. Id. at 7, 752 S.E.2d at 815 (quoting Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 222,
226, 707 S.E.2d 273, 275 (2011)).
68. Id. at 4, 752 S.E.2d at 814.
69. Id. at 4-5, 752 S.E.2d. at 814-15.
70. Id. at 5, 752 S.E.2d at 815.
71. Id. at 13, 752 S.E.2d at 819.
72. Id. at 11, 752 S.E.2d at 818 (quoting Hobson v. Youell, 177 Va. 906, 912-13, 15
80 [Vol. 49:73
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cluded that the circuit court had "the inherent authority to with-
hold a finding of [Starrs's] guilt, to defer the disposition, and to
consider an outcome other than a felony conviction.""
The supreme court, in Maldonado-Mejia v. Commonwealth, ex-
plained what effect a circuit court's deferred finding of guilt has
on an indictment." On May 31, 2011, Maldonado-Mejia entered a
plea in accordance with a plea agreement." The plea agreement
provided for a deferred finding of guilt, pending her completion of
certain programs and undergoing supervised probation." In July
2011, Maldonado-Mejia attempted to buy a firearm." In doing so,
she filled out a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF")
form, which asked if she was under indictment." After answering
"no" to the question, she was charged with and convicted of mak-
ing a false statement on an ATF form." On appeal, she argued
the entry of her plea meant she was no longer "under indict-
ment."0 The supreme court, however, held that since she had not
been convicted or acquitted, she remained "under indictment"
under Virginia law."
2. Re-Sentencing
In Woodard v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether the Court of Appeals of Virginia, after revers-
ing a felony murder conviction, should have also remanded the
case to the circuit court for re-sentencing on the remaining two
felony drug convictions." Woodard argued that the case should
have been remanded because the sentencing guidelines would be
S.E.2d 76, 78 (1941)).
73. Id. at 13, 752 S.E.2d at 819. The dissenting opinion believed "the majority's hold-
ings will 'degrade the otherwise serious act of pleading guilty into something akin to a
move in a game of chess."' Id. at 17, 752 S.E.2d at 822 (McClanahan, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677 (1997)).
74. 287 Va. 49, 51-53, 752 S.E.2d 833, 834-35 (2014).
75. Id. at 51, 752 S.E.2d at 834.
76. Id. at 52, 752 S.E.2d at 834.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 52-53, 752 S.E.2d at 834.
80. Id. at 54, 752 S.E.2d at 835.
81. Id. at 55, 752 S.E.2d at 836.
82. 287 Va. 276, 278, 754 S.E.2d 309, 310 (2014); see Woodard v. Commonwealth, 61
Va. App. 567, 576, 739 S.E.2d 220, 224 (2013).
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different than those used during the first sentencing hearing."
The supreme court explained that because of the discretionary
nature of sentencing guidelines, Woodard had not suffered any
reviewable prejudice.8 4 The court concluded that Woodard was not
entitled to a new sentencing proceeding just because the sentenc-
ing guidelines with a felony murder conviction would be different
than the sentencing guidelines without a felony murder convic-
tion."
3. Jury Instructions
The Court of Appeals of Virginia decided in Bruton v. Com-
monwealth that a circuit court did not err in informing the jury
during the sentencing phase that the defendant would receive
sentence credit for the time he had been incarcerated while
awaiting trial." In arguing against allowing a circuit court to tell
the jury about pretrial sentencing credits, Bruton relied on the
statement in Coward v. Commonwealth that a jury should "im-
pose such sentence as seems just" and not concern itself with
what may happen afterwards." The court of appeals held that in-
structing the jury about sentencing credits "did not implicate the
policy considerations underlying the Coward rule."" As the court
of appeals explained, instructing the jury about Bruton's statuto-
ry credit for time served awaiting trial complied with the impera-
tive that a jury is to be given "the benefit of all significant and
appropriate information that would avoid the necessity that it
speculate or act upon misconceptions concerning the effect of its
decision."" If the circuit court had not done so, according to the
court of appeals, it would have deprived the jury of "significant
and appropriate information necessary to prevent potential mis-
conceptions concerning the effect of its decision.""
83. Woodard, 287 Va. at 281, 754 S.E.2d at 312.
84. Id. at 281-82, 754 S.E.2d at 312.
85. Id. at 282, 754 S.E.2d at 312.
86. 63 Va. App. 210, 212, 755 S.E.2d 485, 486 (2014).
87. Id. at 213, 755 S.E.2d at 486 (quoting Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 639,
646, 178 S.E. 797, 800 (1935)).
88. Id. at 216, 755 S.E.2d at 488.
89. Id. at 217, 755 S.E.2d at 488 (quoting Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104,
113, 532 S.E.2d 629, 633 (2000)).
90. Id.
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C. Appeals
1. Contemporaneous Objections
The issue in a number of recent cases was whether the alleged
error had been preserved for appeal by a contemporaneous objec-
tion. In Commonwealth v. Amos, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether the preservation exception in Virginia Code
section 8.01-384(A) applied to the defendant's circumstances."
Under that exception, when a litigant, through no fault of his
own, is prevented from making a contemporaneous objection to a
court's ruling or order, the failure to object "shall not thereafter
prejudice" the litigant on appeal." After it appeared that Amos
falsely testified in a case, she was held in summary contempt and
immediately taken to jail without any consideration from the trial
court." The Court of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en banc, held by
operation of section 8.01-384(A) that Amos did not have an oppor-
tunity to object to being held in contempt at the time of the rul-
ing; therefore, the arguments she made on appeal were not pro-
cedurally defaulted under Rule 5A:18-the contemporaneous
objection rule."
In affirming the court of appeals, the supreme court empha-
sized that "[t]he statute impose[d] no requirement that when the
contemporaneous objection exception applies, a party . . . must
file a post-conviction objection or otherwise bring the objection to
the court's attention at a later point in the proceedings."" The
court further emphasized that since litigants will rarely be pre-
cluded from making contemporaneous objections, the preserva-
tion exception to section 8.01-384(A) will be used sparingly." But
when a party is denied the opportunity to raise a contemporane-
ous objection, as in the unusual circumstances of Amos's case,
then the exception applies."
91. 287 Va. 301, 303, 754 S.E.2d 304, 305 (2014).
92. Id. at 306, 754 S.E.2d at 307 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-384(A) (Repl. Vol.
2007 & Cum. Supp. 2014)).
93. Id. at 304, 754 S.E.2d at 306.
94. Id. at 305, 754 S.E.2d at 306 (citing Amos v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 730,
737, 741, 740 S.E.2d 43, 46-47, 49 (2013)).
95. Id. at 306-07, 754 S.E.2d at 307.
96. Id. at 309, 754 S.E.2d at 308.
97. Id., 754 S.E.2d at 308-09.
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The supreme court illustrated when the preservation exception
in section 8.01-384(A) applies, and when it does not, in the consol-
idated cases of Maxwell v. Commonwealth and Rowe v. Common-
wealth." Maxwell and his counsel left the courtroom while the ju-
ry deliberated." In their absence, the jury submitted questions
and the circuit court answered them.' Maxwell filed a post-trial
motion to set aside the conviction, arguing that the circuit court's
ex parte communications violated his right to be personally pre-
sent.o' The court of appeals determined that Rule 5A: 18 prohibit-
ed consideration of the merits of Maxwell's appeal.'02 The supreme
court disagreed and applied the preservation exception in section
8.01-384(A) to Maxwell's circumstances.' 3 Because neither Max-
well nor his attorney were present when the circuit court consid-
ered and responded to the jury's questions, the supreme court de-
termined that Maxwell had no opportunity to object to the circuit
court's response to the jury's questions in his absence. 0 4
The supreme court declined to apply the preservation excep-
tion to Rowe's circumstances.o' There, Rowe's counsel attempted
to object to the prosecutor's closing argument.' But in stating his
objection, Rowe's counsel said only: "Actually, before I make my
argument, there is a motion I would like to make outside the
presence of the jury."1o' When the circuit court indicated its intent
to "deal with it when the jury goes out to retire," Rowe's counsel
responded, "[v]ery well."' After the jury left to deliberate, Rowe's
counsel made a motion for a mistrial based on alleged improper
argument by the prosecutor.o' On appeal, the supreme court held
Rowe failed to satisfy the contemporaneous objection requirement
because he "failed to state for the court the details of his objection
or the time-sensitive nature of his motion.""0 And since the jury
98. 287 Va. 258, 261, 754 S.E.2d 516, 517 (2014).
99. Id. at 262, 754 S.E.2d at 517.
100. Id., 754 S.E.2d at 517-18.
101. Id. at 263,, 754 S.E.2d at 518.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 266-67, 754 S.E.2d at 520.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 267, 754 S.E.2d at 520.
106. Id. at 264, 754 S.E.2d at 518.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 268, 754 S.E.2d at 521.
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had already left to deliberate before Rowe made the reason for his
objection known to the circuit court, it was too late."' Rowe "did
not move for a mistrial at a time when the circuit court could
have taken action to correct the asserted error.""2
In Linnon v. Commonwealth, the supreme court considered, as
a matter of first impression, whether a defendant that does not
expressly adopt the objection of a co-defendant may nonetheless
rely on that objection on appeal."' While employed as teachers at
a vocational school, Craig Linnon and his wife Angela engaged in
sexual activity with a sixteen-year-old female student."' Charged
with taking indecent liberties with a minor by a person in a cus-
todial or supervisory relationship, the Linnons were tried jointly,
but separate counsel represented them."' During trial, the Com-
monwealth proposed four contested jury instructions."' On appeal
to the court of appeals, Craig argued the proposed jury instruc-
tions were incorrect statements of law."' As to the first three of
the instructions, the court of appeals ruled that "only Angela ob-
jected to them"; therefore, "Craig failed to preserve his argument
for appeal [as required by] Rule 5A:18.""' On appeal to the su-
preme court, Craig argued that Angela's objections should have
been imputed to him because the circuit court understood the
joint nature of the defense and had the opportunity to rule on the
issue."' The supreme court disagreed and adopted the "general
rule" that "one party may not rely on the objection of another par-
ty to preserve an argument for appeal without expressly joining
in the objection."2 0
111. Id. at 268-69, 754 S.E.2d at 521.
112. Id. at 268, 754 S.E.2d at 521. In dissent, Justices Lemons and Mims would have
applied the preservation exception, Virginia Code section 8.01-384(A), to Rowe's circum-
stances. Id. at 269, 271, 754 S.E.2d at 521-22 (Lemons, J., dissenting). Justice McClana-
han disagreed with the majority's application of that exception to Maxwell's circumstanc-
es. Id. at 271, 754 S.E.2d at 522 (McClanahan, J., dissenting).
113. 287 Va. 92, 102, 752 S.E.2d 822, 828 (2014).
114. Id. at 96, 752 S.E.2d at 824-25.
115. Id. at 97, 752 S.E.2d at 825.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 101, 752 S.E.2d at 828.
118. Id. at 101-02, 752 S.E.2d at 828.
119. Id. at 102, 752 S.E.2d at 828.
120. Id.
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2. Assignments of Error
In a pair of cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia signaled a re-
luctance to dismiss appeals based on an assignment of error that
is not specific enough. In Findlay v. Commonwealth, the supreme
court took up the issue of whether the assignment of error com-
plied with the specificity requirements of Rule 5A:12(c)(1)(ii).12 1
Under that rule, an assignment of error that "merely states that
the judgment or award is contrary to the law and the evidence is
not sufficient."2 2 Findlay's assignment of error read: "The Peti-
tioner/Appellant assigns as error the trial court's denial of his
Motion to Suppress all of the seized videos that came from the de-
fendant's computer, and his computer hard drive, and all deriva-
tives thereof.""3
The supreme court found that Findlay's assignment of error ex-
ceeded "the bare-bones allegations prohibited by Rule
5A:12(c)(1)(ii)."'24 In the supreme court's view, Findlay sufficiently
"point[ed] to a specific preliminary ruling of the trial court-[its]
denial of his motion to suppress-that he believe [d] to be in er-
ror.""' The supreme court rejected the suggestion that the rule
"demands the inclusion of a 'because' clause or its equivalent in
each assignment of error."'26 The supreme court found such a re-
quirement would be impractical, and in many instances "impossi-
ble to satisfy, [because] trial judges do not always state the specif-
ic reasons for their rulings."'27 Thus, the supreme court reasoned
that "requiring a 'because' clause in each assignment of error
would create an unnecessary procedural trap that may bar appel-
late review of meritorious claims.' 22
The supreme court applied the ruling in Findlay to a different
assignment of error in Commonwealth v. Herring.12 Herring's as-
121. 287 Va. 111, 113, 752 S.E.2d 868, 870 (2014).
122. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:12(c)(1)(ii) (2014).
123. Findlay, 287 Va. at 113, 752 S.E.2d at 870.
124. Id. at 116, 752 S.E.2d at 871.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id., 752 S.E.2d at 872.
128. Id. The dissenting opinion believed Findlay failed to satisfy the requirement in
Rule 5A:12(c)(1) and Rule 5:17(c)(1) that "an assignment of error list 'the specific errors in
the rulings below."' Id. at 118, 752 S.E.2d at 873 (Powell, J., dissenting).
129. No. 130989, 2014 Va. LEXIS 94, at *8, 758 S.E.2d 225, 230 (June 5, 2014).
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signment of error stated: "1. The trial court erred by failing to
grant the defendant[']s motion to strike the Commonwealth's evi-
dence as being insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his con-
victions for attempted murder, abduction[,] and the use of a fire-
arm in the commission of a felony."'
The Commonwealth, in part, argued the assignment of error
was insufficient because it "merely state[d] that the judgment is
contrary to the law and the evidence.""' The Commonwealth at-
tempted to distinguish Findlay by suggesting that cases involving
the sufficiency of the evidence differ from those challenging the
suppression of the evidence."' As to sufficiency of the evidence
claims, the Commonwealth argued that "appellants should be re-
quired to provide greater substance than what Findlay outlined
for an assignment of error to be sufficient.""' The supreme court
disagreed and found Findlay dispositive."" In the court's view,
Herring's assignment of error pointed to a specific ruling Herring
believed to be in error-the court's failure to grant Herring's mo-
tion to strike."' Thus, the supreme court found that Herring had
satisfied Rule 5A:12(c)(1)(ii) by "lay[ing] his finger on the error in
his assignment of error.""' The court again rejected the proposi-
tion that "appellants include a 'because' clause or its equivalent
in their assignments of error to explain why it was error for the
trial court to take the action that it did.""
II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Searches
In Rideout v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether the police breached the defendant's reasona-
130. Id. *5-6, 758 S.E.2d at 229.
131. Id. at *7, 758 S.E.2d at 230.
132. Id. at *9, 758 S.E.2d at 230.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *7, 758 S.E.2d at 230.
135. Id. at *8, 758 S.E.2d at 230.
136. Id. at *9, 758 S.E.2d at 230 (quoting Findlay v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 111, 115,
752 S.E.2d 868, 871 (2014)).
137. Id. at *9-10, 758 S.E.2d at 230. The dissenting opinion stated, "it is now difficult
to envision an assignment of error that would be deemed insufficient under the majority's
reasoning." Id. at *37, 758 S.E.2d at 238 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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ble expectation of privacy in the contents of his personal comput-
er files.'"' During an investigation into the exploitation of children
on the Internet, police discovered that child pornography had
been shared on a peer-to-peer file sharing program called Sharea-
za LE from an Internet protocol ("IP") address issued to
Rideout."' Police executed a search warrant at Rideout's resi-
dence and discovered more child pornography. 40 In an attempt to
suppress the child pornography that gave rise to the search war-
rant, Rideout claimed he had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his computer files under the Fourth Amendment because he
had been using the Shareaza program under the mistaken belief
he had disabled its sharing features.14 '
The court of appeals held that Rideout did not have an expecta-
tion of privacy in those files given his decision to install the
Shareaza file-sharing program on his computer.'42 The court com-
pared Rideout's installation of the program to "a person who
hands over the keys to his house to a number of friends." 4' As the
court of appeals explained, "[tlhat person should not be surprised
when some of those friends simply come inside his house without
knocking on the door."'44 The court further explained that even if
Rideout had the subjective intention to prevent others from ac-
cessing his files, he did not have an objective reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in those files."'4 By installing the file-sharing pro-
gram on his computer, Rideout assumed the risk that others-
including the police-could access his files. 46
The court of appeals again considered whether the police vio-
lated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights while investigat-
ing the defendant for possession of child pornography in Jeffers v.
138. 62 Va. App. 779, 782, 753 S.E.2d 595, 597 (2014).
139. Id. at 782-83, 753 S.E.2d at 597.
140. Id. at 783-84, 753 S.E.2d at 597.
141. See id. at 784-86, 753 S.E.2d at 597-98.
142. Id. at 789, 753 S.E.2d at 600.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 789-90, 753 S.E.2d at 600 (applying the logic of United States v. Borowy,
595 F.3d 1045, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 2010)).
146. Id. at 790, 753 S.E.2d at 600. The court of appeals further held that the exclusion-
ary rule would not be an appropriate remedy because "the police clearly did not engage in
any conduct that ought to be deterred through the application of the exclusionary rule." Id.
at 790-92, 753 S.E.2d at 600-01.
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Commonwealth."' Police obtained a search warrant after discov-
ering child pornography had been downloaded from an IP address
located at Jeffers's residence."' The search warrant directed the
officers to search for evidence of child pornography at Jeffers's
property, including the home and barn."' During the search, po-
lice discovered that Jeffers actually lived in the barn and that a
computer in the barn contained child pornography.5 o
On appeal, Jeffers argued that "the officers misinterpreted the
scope of the warrant to include the barn."'"' Jeffers reasoned that
once officers discovered that Jeffers actually lived in the barn,
they could not search there because the barn was no longer with-
in the scope of the warrant.'5 2 The court of appeals disagreed,
pointing out that "[t]he search warrant did not state that the
barn could be searched only if no one resided in it."'"' Further-
more, "[t]he officers were not required to assume that the magis-
trate assumed the barn was unoccupied."' The court found
"[s]uch a piling of one assumption upon another" could not be
"squared with the straightforward reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment." 5
In Fauntleroy v. Commonwealth, the court of appeals consid-
ered whether a vehicle was lawfully impounded and, thus,
whether the resulting inventory search of that vehicle violated
the Fourth Amendment.'"' During a traffic stop, the officer dis-
covered that Fauntleroy's vehicle displayed an inspection sticker
that had been issued for a different vehicle.'" When questioned
about it, Fauntleroy admitted to purchasing the "hot" sticker.'
The officer impounded the vehicle, conducted an inventory
search, and discovered illegal drugs in the vehicle.'59 The circuit
147. 62 Va. App. 151, 154, 156, 743 S.E.2d 289, 290-91 (2013).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 155, 743 S.E.2d at 291.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 156, 743 S.E.2d at 291.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 158, 743 S.E.2d at 292.
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing United States v. Nichols, 344 F.3d 793, 797-98 (8th Cir. 2003)).
156. 62 Va. App. 238, 239-40, 746 S.E.2d 65, 65 (2013).
157. Id. at 241-42, 746 S.E.2d at 66-67.
158. Id. at 242, 746 S.E.2d at 67.
159. Id.
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court denied Fauntleroy's motion to suppress the drugs found in
the search.160
In affirming the circuit court's denial of the motion to suppress,
the court of appeals held the officer's decision to impound the ve-
hicle was objectively reasonable."' The court of appeals observed
that, based on Fauntleroy's unauthorized possession of the fraud-
ulent inspection sticker, an officer could reasonably infer Faunt-
leroy's vehicle likely had a significant defect that rendered it un-
safe to operate on the highways until it was repaired.162 An officer
could also reasonably infer that Fauntleroy did not intend to have
the vehicle inspected, given his "fraudulent display of an inspec-
tion sticker that had been issued for another vehicle."63
B. Specific Crimes
1. Driving Without a Valid Driver's License
In Carew v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
explained the proof required to convict a defendant of driving a
motor vehicle without a valid driver's license in violation of Vir-
ginia Code section 46.2-300.'" At the time of her charge of driving
without a valid driver's license, Carew's license had been sus-
pended for failing to attend a clinic interview.'65 The Department
of Motor Vehicles had sent Carew an order requiring her to at-
tend a clinic interview, but the letter was returned "unclaimed.""
On appeal, Carew argued her conviction should be overturned be-
cause the evidence did not show she had been notified that her li-
cense had been suspended.' The court of appeals prefaced that
"[a] license is not suspended until notice of that status is received
by the holder,"'6 8 and explained that "[w]hen the predicate for in-
validity under [Virginia] Code § 46.2-300 is a suspended license,
the Commonwealth must prove the defendant received notice of
160. Id. at 244, 746 S.E.2d at 67-68.
161. Id. at 248, 746 S.E.2d at 70.
162. Id. at 251, 746 S.E.2d at 71.
163. Id.
164. 62 Va. App. 574, 575, 750 S.E.2d 226, 227 (2013).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 575-76, 750 S.E.2d at 227.
167. Id. at 575, 750 S.E.2d at 227.
168. Id. at 578, 750 S.E.2d at 228.
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the suspension.""6 Since the evidence did not prove that Carew
had notice that her driver's license was suspended, the court of
appeals reversed her conviction.'
2. Conspiracy
The charges in Chambliss v. Commonwealth arose from a car
chase that began in Spotsylvania County."' While being trans-
ported to jail, Chambliss escaped from police, jumped into a car
driven by his co-conspirator, and fled." 2 Shortly thereafter,
Chambliss and the co-conspirator were apprehended in Caroline
County."' Chambliss was tried and convicted in Caroline County
of conspiracy to elude the police."' Chambliss argued the conspir-
acy to elude occurred entirely in Spotsylvania County; once the
car entered Caroline County, there was no evidence of any new
conspiracy to sustain the conviction."' Conspiracy, however, can
be a continuing offense in certain circumstances." Under the to-
tality of the circumstances, the Court of Appeals of Virginia found
sufficient evidence to demonstrate "a single conspiracy continuing
from Spotsylvania County into Caroline County."'
3. Firearms
In Jordan v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
revisited the proof needed to sustain a conviction for possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Virginia Code section
18.2-308.2.'7 A thirteen-year-old witness testified that while his
father was inside a convenience store, Jordan approached his ve-
hicle, pointed a "gun" at his head, and told him to get out of the
169. Id. at 578-79, 750 S.E.2d at 228.
170. Id.
171. 62 Va. App. 459, 463, 749 S.E.2d 212, 214 (2013).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 463-64, 749 S.E.2d at 214-15.
174. Id. at 464, 749 S.E.2d at 215.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 467-68, 749 S.E.2d at 216-17; see also Barber v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.
App. 172, 177-78, 360 S.E.2d 888, 890-91 (1987) (citing United States v. MacDougall, 790
F.2d 1135, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986)).
177. Chambliss, 62 Va. App. at 468, 749 S.E.2d at 217.
178. 286 Va. 153, 155, 747 S.E.2d 799, 799 (2013).
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truck.' The witness also testified that he was familiar with
handguns and that Jordan's gun appeared to be a "Raven" semi-
automatic pistol.' In affirming Jordan's conviction for possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, the supreme court observed that
even though Jordan did not verbally threaten to kill the witness,
the acts of pointing the gun at the witness and directing him to
exit the truck suggested that if the witness did not comply, Jor-
dan would shoot him.'"' The supreme court explained that this
conduct, along with the witness's identification of the firearm as a
"Raven" pistol, were matters for the trier of fact."' Refusing to
substitute its judgment for that of the jury, the supreme court
found sufficient evidence to convict Jordan of the offense.8
In Bonner v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia,
sitting en banc, considered the proper venue for the charge of al-
tering a serial number on a firearm in violation of section 18.2-
311.1.184 Bonner was found with the firearm in question in
Brunswick County.' There was "scant" evidence, however, about
the firearm.' Specifically, "[t]here was no testimony as to who
had filed down the serial number, when it was obliterated, or
where the removal was done."' When a crime constitutes a dis-
crete act, venue is generally appropriate where the crime is com-
mitted.' In contrast, "[w]hen a crime constitutes a continuing of-
fense, venue may be proper in more than one jurisdiction.""
Analyzing the plain language of section 18.2-311.1, the court of
appeals held that the crime of altering a serial number is a dis-
crete act, and not a continuing offense.' 0 Once a person "inten-
tionally removes, defaces, alters, changes, destroys, or oblite-
179. Id., 747 S.E.2d at 800.
180. Id. at 158, 747 S.E.2d at 801.
181. Id. at 158-59, 747 S.E.2d at 801-02.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 159, 747 S.E.2d at 801-02. The dissenting opinion disagreed that the evi-
dence was sufficient to convict Jordan, opining that the majority upheld the conviction
solely on the witness's belief the instrument looked like a firearm. See id. at 159-63, 747
S.E.2d at 802-04. (Powell, J., dissenting).
184. 62 Va. App. 206, 208-09, 745 S.E.2d 162, 163-64 (2013).
185. Id. at 209-10, 745 S.E.2d at 164.
186. Id. at 210, 745 S.E.2d at 164.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 211-12, 745 S.E.2d at 165.
189. Id. at 212, 745 S.E.2d at 165.
190. Id.
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rates" the serial number of a firearm, the crime is complete."'
Under the facts of the case, there was no evidence Bonner was
the one who filed down the serial number, let alone any evidence
of where that discrete act occurred that would create a "strong
presumption" that venue in Brunswick County was proper.
4. Forgery and Uttering
In Henry v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reversed the defendant's forgery and uttering convictions.' Hen-
ry had provided false financial information to a court clerk when
completing and signing forms to determine his eligibility for indi-
gent defense services.194 Relying on.the proposition that "the gra-
vamen of forgery is the want of genuineness or authenticity in a
document," Henry argued he did not commit forgery because the
financial statements were still financial statements, even if they
contained a lie.'9 The court of appeals agreed, observing that "in
order for Henry's forgery conviction to be upheld, the Common-
wealth was required to prove that Henry's conduct with respect to
the financial statements altered the genuineness and authentici-
ty of those documents, making them not in fact what they pur-
ported to be.""' Despite Henry's misrepresentations, the court of
appeals found his conduct did not alter the financial statements'
"material nature."
5. Involuntary Manslaughter
The involuntary manslaughter charges in Cheung v. Common-
wealth arose from a bus crash on Interstate 95 in which the bus
driver fell asleep, killing four passengers.' For a number of rea-
sons, the Court of Appeals of Virginia found the bus driver,
Cheung, criminally negligent for causing the crash."'9 First, the
191. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-311.1 (Repl. Vol. 2014)).
192. Id. at 215-16, 745 S.E.2d at 167.
193. 63 Va. App. 30, 34, 753 S.E.2d 868, 870 (2014).
194. Id. at 35-36, 753 S.E.2d at 870.
195. Id. at 39-40, 753 S.E.2d at 872 (citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 178,
188, 692 S.E.2d 271, 276 (2010)).
196. Id. at 40, 753 S.E.2d at 872.
197. Id. at 42, 753 S.E.2d at 873.
198. 63 Va. App. 1, 3, 753 S.E.2d 854, 855 (2014).
199. Id. at 8, 11-13, 753 S.E.2d at 857, 859-60.
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record showed Cheung undertook a trip of substantial distance
while in a sleepy condition.20 0 Second, ample evidence established
that Cheung-who had consumed multiple energy drinks and told
others he was tired-was aware of his impaired condition hours
before the crash.201 Third, given his erratic driving prior to the
crash, Cheung should have known his drowsy state was adversely
affecting his driving.202 Finally, Cheung was more culpable than
the typical driver since he "disregarded the risk that he would fall
asleep while driving a bus."20 ' As the court of appeals emphasized,
"[w]hen a bus is driven negligently, this negligence threatens the
safety of not only those traveling near the bus, but also the safety
of the numerous passengers riding on the bus."204
6. Malicious Wounding
In Burkeen v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether one punch with a bare fist constituted mali-
cious wounding.205 While outside of a bar, Burkeen approached
the victim and asked to see his pool cue.206 Burkeen then demand-
ed the victim sell him the pool cue.20' When the victim attempted
to retrieve the cue, Burkeen let go of it and immediately punched
the victim in the face.208 Burkeen cursed at and degraded the vic-
tim, proclaimed he was in the Army and could bench press 200
pounds, and began to strike the victim again before a third indi-
vidual intervened and stopped him.209 The victim suffered a frac-
ture of the bones around his cheek and nose.2 10
A conviction for malicious wounding requires an "intent to
maim, disfigure, disable, or kill."2 1' Under ordinary circumstances
that intent cannot be presumed from a punch with a bare fist;
200. Id. at 11, 753 S.E.2d at 859.
201. Id. at 12, 753 S.E.2d at 859.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 13, 753 S.E.2d at 859.
204. Id., 753 S.E.2d at 859-60.
205. 286 Va. 255, 257, 749 S.E.2d 172, 173 (2013).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id., 749 S.E.2d at 173-74.
209. Id. at 257-58, 749 S.E.2d at 174.
210. Id. at 258, 749 S.E.2d at 174.
211. Id. at 259, 749 S.E.2d at 174 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-51 (Repl. Vol. 2014)).
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however, "an assault with a bare fist may be attended with such
circumstances of violence and brutality" that an intent to maim
may be established.2 12 In making this determination, the supreme
court found it proper "to consider not only the method by which a
victim is wounded, but also the circumstances under which that
injury was inflicted in determining whether there is sufficient ev-
idence to prove [malicious wounding]."m' The supreme court found
that the circumstances of Burkeen's unprovoked attack constitut-
ed such violence and brutality that, even though Burkeen deliv-
ered only one blow, he acted with malice and intended to maim
the victim.
7. Possession of Child Pornography
In Papol v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether charges of possession of child pornography
under the recidivism provision of the statute could be tried to-
gether in the same proceeding as the predicate offense.215 The
grand jury charged Papol with one count of possession of child
pornography under subsection (A) of Virginia Code section 18.2-
374.1:1, and eleven additional counts of possession of child por-
nography, second or subsequent violation, under subsection (B) of
the statute.216 Papol argued he could not be charged with the ad-
ditional eleven counts unless they physically occurred after he
had already been convicted of the first count.' The court of ap-
peals reasoned since subsection (B) of the statute did not use the
word "conviction" as a predicate for the enhanced felony charge,
but simply spoke of a "second or subsequent violation," the legis-
lature intended to authorize the enhanced penalty without a prior
conviction.2 18 Therefore, the court of appeals held that Papol
"committed the first violation when he possessed the first
212. Id., 749 S.E.2d at 175 (quoting Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 636, 640, 166
S.E.2d 269, 273 (1969)).
213. Id. at 260-61, 749 S.E.2d at 175.
214. Id. at 261, 749 S.E.2d at 176.
215. 63 Va. App. 150, 153-54, 754 S.E.2d 918, 920 (2014) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
374.1:1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2014)).
216. Id. at 152-53, 754 S.E.2d at 920; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1:1(A)-(B) (Repl.
Vol. 2014).
217. Papol, 63 Va. App. at 153, 754 S.E.2d at 920.
218. Id. at 155, 754 S.E.2d at 921.
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offending image [and e]ach of the other images he possessed was
a subsequent violation of the statute."2 19
8. Sodomy
In a recent federal habeas corpus case, MacDonald v. Moose,
the Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit found the anti-sodomy
provisions of Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A) facially unconsti-
tutional.220 In Saunders v. Commonwealth, Saunders collaterally
attacked his underlying convictions of consensual sodomy with
juveniles under section 18.2-361(A).22 1 Saunders urged the Court
of Appeals of Virginia to adopt the Fourth Circuit's ruling, reject
a contrary decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia, and find
the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter judgment against
him for his crime.222 The court of appeals declined, finding the
Fourth Circuit's holding in MacDonald merely persuasive.2 23
Since the Supreme Court of Virginia had upheld the constitution-
ality of section 18.2-361(A), the court of appeals was bound to fol-
low that precedent.22 4
9. Unreasonable Refusal
In DAmico v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
interpreted the statute prohibiting the unreasonable refusal to
submit to a breath test-Virginia Code section 18.2-268.3.225 Be
fore attempting to administer the breath test to D'Amico, the
breath test operator read a refusal form, as required by section
18.2-268.3(B).2 2 ' D'Amico refused to take the test.227 Thereafter,
219. Id.
220. 710 F.3d 154, 156 (4th Cir. 2013) (applying Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003)).
221. 62 Va. App. 793, 799, 801, 753 S.E.2d 602, 605-06 (2014). Saunders's collateral
attack came during the direct appeal of his convictions for breaching the terms of his sus-
pended sentence. Id. at 799, 753 S.E.2d at 605.
222. Id. at 804, 753 S.E.2d at 607.
223. Id., 753 S.E.2d at 608.
224. Id. at 805, 753 S.E.2d at 608 (citing McDonald v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 249,
260, 645 S.E.2d 918, 924 (2007)). The 2014 Virginia General Assembly amended Virginia
Code section 18.2-361(A) by removing the language prohibiting sodomy. See infra Part
(IV)(G). And the Supreme Court of Virginia has granted review of Saunders' appeal.
Saunders v. Commonwealth, appeal granted, No. 140507 (Va. Sept. 16, 2014).
225. 287 Va. 284, 286, 288, 754 S.E.2d 291, 292-93 (2014).
226. Id. at 286, 754 S.E.2d at 292; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2014).
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the arresting officer signed the refusal form and presented it to
the magistrate to charge D'Amico with unreasonably refusing to
take a breath test.2 8 During his bench trial, D'Amico unsuccess-
fully argued that not only was the refusal form inadmissible, but
also that his conviction was invalid because the breath test opera-
tor, not the arresting officer, had actually read the refusal form to
h*229him.
The crux of D'Amico's argument on appeal was that the reading
and execution of the refusal form, as stated in subsections (B) and
(C) of the statute, constituted part of the elements of the offense
of unreasonable refusal.2 0 The supreme court, however, observed
that the elements of the offense are completely stated in subsec-
tion (A): "unreasonably refusing to submit to a blood and/or
breath test after being arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol or drugs."23 ' The supreme court held that subsection (A)
does not incorporate the procedural requirements set forth in
subsections (B) and (C).2 " Thus, D'Amico was not prejudiced by
the admission of the refusal form and "its admission was, at most,
harmless error."
III. LEGISLATION
A. Accessories After the Fact
Previously, accessories after the fact to any felony were guilty
of a Class 1 misdemeanor.2 34 Under new legislation, an accessory
after the fact to a homicide offense that is punishable by death or
as a Class 2 felony is guilty of a Class 6 felony.
227. DAmico, 287 Va. at 287, 754 S.E.2d at 293.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 289, 754 S.E.2d at 294.
231. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2014)).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 290, 754 S.E.2d at 294.
234. See VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-19 (Repl. Vol. 2014).
235. Act of Apr. 6, 2014, ch. 668, 2014 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-19 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
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B. "Celebratory Gunfire"
Seven-year-old Brendon Mackey died after he was struck by a
falling bullet fired at a Fourth of July fireworks show.236 The 2014
Virginia General Assembly passed "Brendon's Law" to strengthen
the penalty for celebratory gunfire.3 Under the legislation, "[a]ny
person who handles any firearm in a manner so gross, wanton,
and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life and
causes the serious bodily injury of another person resulting in
permanent and significant physical impairment is guilty of a
Class 6 felony."238
C. Conditional Guilty Plea for Misdemeanors
Virginia Code section 19.2-254 allows a defendant to enter a
conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the adverse
determination of a pretrial motion, such as a motion to sup-
press. 3' The defendant may withdraw the guilty plea if he or she
prevails on appeal.240 Under the statute's old language, a defend-
ant could not enter a conditional guilty plea to a misdemeanor
charge-he could only do so for felonies.2 4' The 2014 Virginia
General Assembly gave defendants the same right to enter a con-
ditional guilty plea in a misdemeanor case in circuit court that
242exists in a felony case.
D. Judicial Recusal for Rejected Plea Agreements
If a judge rejects a plea agreement in a criminal or juvenile de-
linquency case, the law now requires the judge to immediately
236. Markus Schmidt, Bill on Celebratory Gunfire Is Signed, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,
Apr. 4, 2014, at B2.
237. See id.
238. Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 444, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-56.1 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
239. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-254 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
240. Id.
241. See id. (Repl. Vol. 2008); see also Cross v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 484, 493,
642 S.E.2d 763, 767 (2007), vacated on other grounds, 52 Va. App. 598, 665 S.E.2d 861
(2008).
242. Act of Mar. 3, 2014, ch. 52, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-254 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
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recuse himself or herself from any further proceedings on the
same matter unless the parties agree otherwise.243
E. Recording Misdemeanor Cases
The 2014 Virginia General Assembly passed legislation requir-
ing the circuit court in misdemeanor cases to allow the parties to
record evidence and incidents of trial by a mechanical or electron-
ic device in cases in which there is no court reporter or other
court approved recording.244 The purpose of the recording is to aid
counsel in producing a statement of facts for appeal when there is
no transcript."' The recording, however, shall not be made a part
of the record unless otherwise permitted.246
F. "Revenge Porn"
The 2014 Virginia General Assembly passed legislation to crim-
inalize "revenge porn," the vengeful posting of nude photographs
on the internet by former partners.247 Under the legislation, a per-
son is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor if, "[w]ith the intent to co-
erce, harass, or intimidate" the depicted person, he or she "mali-
ciously disseminates or sells any videographic or still image
created by any means whatsoever that depicts another person
who is totally nude, or in a state of undress so as to expose the
genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female breast."248 Venue for the
crime is "in the jurisdiction where the unlawful act occurs or
where any videographic or still image created by any means
whatsoever is produced, reproduced, found, stored, received, or
possessed" in violation of the statute.24 9
243. Act of Mar. 5, 2014, ch. 165, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16.1-277.2, 19.2-254 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
244. Act of Mar. 3, 2014, ch. 78, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-
128.1 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See J. Reynolds Hutchins, Bell Bill Targets 'Revenge Porn,'DAILY PROGRESS (Mar.
10, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/bell-bill-targets-revenge-porn/arti
cle.b5217fae-a8ae-1 1e3-905b-0017a43b2370.html.
248. Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 399, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-386.1, -386.2 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
249. Id.
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G. Sex Crimes
In apparent response to the decision by the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in McDonald v. Moose,250 the 2014 Virginia
General Assembly removed the language generally prohibiting
sodomy from Virginia Code section 18.2-361.2' The 2014 General
Assembly, however, added the words "anal intercourse, cunnilin-
gus, fellatio, and anilingus" to numerous other Virginia Code sec-
tions pertaining to sex trafficking and sex crimes against chil-
dren.252
The 2014 Virginia General Assembly also passed legislation
which states: "In a criminal case in which the defendant is ac-
cused of a felony sexual offense involving a child victim, evidence
of the defendant's conviction of another sexual offense or offenses
is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter
to which it is relevant.",M' The law contains a notice provision re-
quiring the Commonwealth to advise the defendant at least four-
teen days prior to trial that it intends to introduce his prior con-
victions into evidence and to provide documentation of those
convictions.254 The law contains a provision, however, stating that
evidence offered under this provision may still be excluded under
the Virginia Rules of Evidence, including Rule 2:403, involving
the exclusion of relevant evidence on the grounds it is prejudicial,
misleading, confusing, or needlessly cumulative.
H. Wearing a Mask in Public
The 2014 Virginia General Assembly amended Virginia's pro-
hibition against wearing a mask in public to add an intent ele-
ment to the crime.256 Under the law, except in certain situations, a
250. See supra Part III(B)(8).
251. Act of Apr. 23, 2014, ch. 794, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 17.1-275.12, 18.2-67.5:1, -346, -348, -356, -359, -361, -368, -370, -370.1, -371,
-374.3 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
252. See id.
253. Act of Apr. 23, 2014, ch. 782, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
67.7:1 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
254. Id.
255. Id.; see VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:403 (2014).
256. Act of Mar. 5, 2014, ch. 167, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-422 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
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person over the age of sixteen who wears a mask, hood, or other
device that hides or covers a substantial portion of the face with
the intent to conceal his identity is guilty of a Class 6 felony.257
257. Id.
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